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IS THE STAGGERED BOARD DEBATE REALLY SETTLED?
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The debate over staggered boards is heating up, largely because of the appearance of
novel studies—including our own prior research—that challenge the results of earlier
works documenting a negative impact of staggered boards on firm value. Meanwhile,
a third way has appeared in this debate. In a recent article in the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, Settling the Staggered Board Debate, Professors
Amihud, Schmid, and Davidoff Solomon (ASDS) purport to settle this debate, arguing
that neither the position in favor or against staggered boards “has empirical support and,
on average, a staggered board has no significant effect on firm value.”
This Essay addresses the ASDS study and shows that the staggered board debate is
very much alive rather than settled. It does so in two ways. First, it shows that our
prior result that the adoption of a staggered board is associated with a positive increase
in firm value is robust to the criticism in ASDS. Second, this Essay shows that ASDS’s
conclusion that staggered boards have no significant association with firm value is based
on statistical tests that have “poor power,” that is, tests that are unlikely to find a robust
association even if such association is actually supported by the data. In contrast, the
tests that indicate that our earlier results are robust have both much better statistical
power and good “size,” making it unlikely that we can find a positive association
between staggered boards and firm value if no such association exists in the data.
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A lawyer must be told things frankly; then it’s up to us to muddle them up.
ALESSANDRO MANZONI, THE BETROTHED—A TALE OF XVII CENTURY
MILAN (Archibald Colquhoun ed., 1951).
INTRODUCTION
The debate over staggered boards is heating up, largely because of the
appearance of novel studies that challenge the results of earlier works
documenting a negative impact of staggered boards on firm value.1 This debate
relates not just to the value of the staggered board itself, but pertains more broadly
to the central debate over the appropriate division of authority between a
corporation’s board and its shareholders. 2 Critics of the staggered board argue that
it entrenches directors and managers, depriving shareholders of the ability to
discipline incumbents and hence promoting moral hazard.3 Scholars on the
opposite side claim that the protection provided by the staggered board against

See infra Section I.B.
For a full account of the staggered board debate, see K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M.
Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 79-84 (2016).
3 See id. at 82-84.
1
2
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shareholder intervention is only temporary, generally occurs with the approval of
shareholders, and thus constitutes a constructive, bilateral commitment device
towards the creation of long-term firm value.4 We belong to the latter group of
scholars, as we have documented evidence that the adoption of a staggered board
is associated with a positive increase in firm value (and, correspondingly, the
removal of a staggered board with a decline in firm value).5
Meanwhile, a “third way” has appeared in the staggered board debate.
In a recent article in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Professors
Amihud, Schmid, and Davidoff Solomon (ASDS) 6 purport to settle this
debate, arguing that both the theoretical position in favor of and against
staggered boards lack empirical support and on average, “a staggered
board has no significant effect on firm value.” 7
More particularly, ASDS argue that, on the one hand, earlier
empirical studies finding a negative association between having a
staggered board and firm value “do not include important explanatory
variables.” 8 On the other hand, our more recent research documenting a
positive association between staggered boards and firm value—and, in
particular, the result of the article two of us (together with Lubomir
Litov) published in the Journal of Financial Economics in 2017, Staggered
Board and Long-Term Firm Value, Revisited (CLS) 9—would not “account
for the changing nature of the firm over time.” 10 ASDS then add that
once these issues are corrected, the adoption of a staggered board
becomes statistically insignificant. 11
4 See id.

at 123-26.
See K.J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov & Simone M. Sepe, Staggered Boards and LongTerm Firm Value, Revisited, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 422 (2017) (providing evidence that staggered boards
promote value creation for some ﬁrms by committing the ﬁrm to undertaking long-term projects
and bonding it to the relationship-speciﬁc investments of its stakeholders); K.J. Martijn Cremers,
Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, CEO Pay Redux, 96 TEX. L. REV. 205 (2017) (providing
evidence that the adoption of a staggered board does not produce entrenchment in the form of
excessive CEO pay); K.J. Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, Commitment and
Entrenchment in Corporate Governance, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 732, 761-71 (2016) (revisiting the
evidence obtained on the E-Index and showing that defensive measures beneﬁt shareholders as long
as such measures require shareholder approval); Cremers & Sepe, supra note 2, at 100-03 (showing
that in the time-series ﬁrm value increases (decreases) after the adoption (removal) of a staggered
board). While the ASDS criticism focuses on prior studies by Cremers and Sepe only, for simplicity
in the rest of this Article we will use the collective form “we” when referring to the authorship of
those studies.
6 Yakov Amihud, Markus Schmid & Steven Davidoﬀ Solomon, Settling the Staggered Board
Debate, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1475 (2018).
7 Id. at 1477.
8 Id. at 1478.
9 Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5.
10 Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1475.
11 Id. at 1479.
5
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This Essay addresses the ASDS study and further contributes to the
staggered board debate in two central ways. First, it shows that our prior
results on how ﬁrm value changes around changes in board structure (and, in
particular, the result in CLS) are robust to the criticism in ASDS.
Second, this Essay shows that ASDS’s conclusion that staggered boards
have no signiﬁcant association with ﬁrm value is based on statistical tests that
have “poor power.” That is, we show that ASDS’s tests are unlikely to ﬁnd a
robust association even in self-generated samples that are constructed such
that they are very similar to the actual data but where we know for sure that
such association is actually present. This means that the methodology in
ASDS is poorly suited to ﬁnding any association between ﬁrm value and
board structure, as we show that this methodology is biased against ﬁnding
any statistically signiﬁcant association. In contrast, the tests that indicate that
our earlier results are robust have much better statistical power as well as good
“size,” which means that they are unlikely to ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant
association if such an association was not actually supported by the data.
Thus, the ASDS study does not settle the staggered board debate. Nonetheless,
it contributes, in part, to advance this debate. Indeed, ASDS find that
prior studies, including the study by Professors Bebchuk and Cohen, do not
include important explanatory variables that affect firm value and are correlated
with the presence or absence of a staggered board. The result is that these studies
have inappropriately attributed a lower firm value to the presence of the
staggered board instead of to these omitted variables.12

This result is fully consistent with the result we obtained in our prior
staggered board studies. In these works, we revisited the 2005 cross-sectional
study by Professors Bebchuk and Cohen (BC) 13 by employing the use of a
time-series panel (i.e., a pooled panel model with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects)—a
methodology that allows us to compare the average ﬁrm value before versus
after a change in board structure. 14 Through this methodology, we ﬁnd that
reverse causality explains the cross-sectional ﬁnding in BC of a negative
association between staggered boards and ﬁrm value. 15 This means that ex
ante less valuable ﬁrms are more likely to seek increased board protection
through adopting a staggered board (and that ﬁrm value tends to go up, not
down, with the adoption of a staggered board), rather than increased board
protection causing ﬁrms to become less valuable. Consistent with this result,
Id. at 1478 (footnote omitted).
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409 (2005).
See Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 425-30; Cremers & Sepe, supra note 2, at 10003. See also infra Section I.B. (explaining the difference between a cross-sectional analysis and a timeseries analysis).
15 See Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 433-34.
12
13
14
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ASDS also ﬁnd that “past performance variables have a negative eﬀect on
whether the ﬁrm has a staggered board.” 16
This is the beauty of ongoing debates. These debates promote further study,
the deployment of novel analytical tools, and, hopefully, advances in research. In
the staggered board debate, we think that one such advance has been made: the
long-prevailing view that staggered boards are detrimental to long-term
shareholder value is now rejected as unsupported by the data.
The remainder of this reply is organized as follows. Part I briefly overviews the
current status of the empirical debate on the financial value of staggered boards.
Part II shows that the main result in CLS—that the adoption or removal of a
staggered board is associated with a respective increase (decrease) in long-term firm
value—is robust to the ASDS criticism. Part III employs the bootstrapping
methodology17 to further show that the ASDS claim that staggered boards have no
effect on firm value is only apparent because it reflects the use of a statistical
methodology (i.e., pooled panel firm value regressions with firm fixed effects) with
poor statistical power. Part II also shows that, in contrast, the positive association
between staggered boards and firm value is robust when using an alternative
methodology (i.e., change in firm value regressions) with stronger power. Last, Part
III shows that both tests are not more likely to find evidence for any association if
no such association is actually present in the bootstrapped samples, that is, that both
these tests have good statistical size. Part IV discusses some of the additional
robustness tests we performed in our prior staggered board studies, which ASDS
ignore. Section V provides our brief conclusion.
I. THE DEBATE ON STAGGERED BOARDS
In order to make our discussion of Settling the Staggered Board Debate more
accessible, this Part provides the background necessary for understanding the
context and importance of the empirical debate on staggered boards, which
ASDS purports to settle. While a large body of studies have examined the
eﬀect of staggered boards on ﬁrm value and corporate governance more
generally, we will provide only a general description of these studies and focus
in more detail on the two studies that ASDS attempt to replicate: the 2005
study by BC 18 and the 2017 study coauthored by CLS. 19 After that, we will
also brieﬂy describe the main ﬁndings in ASDS.

Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1497.
The “bootstrapping” methodology uses random sampling techniques to estimate the
statistical properties of an estimator (i.e., the methodology that we use to estimate the association
of staggered boards with ﬁrm value).
18 Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 13.
19 Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5.
16
17
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A. Earlier Studies
Earlier empirical studies exploring the wealth eﬀects of staggered boards
include studies employing governance indices and short-term event studies
examining stock price reactions to the adoption/elimination of a staggered
board. 20 These studies have generally found that staggered boards are
associated with lower ﬁrm value.
However, as we have discussed in detail elsewhere, 21 a general problem
aﬀecting such studies is that they exhibit signiﬁcant methodological
limitations. For example, some of the governance provisions included in a
governance index “may matter more than others, some may have an impact
only in speciﬁc circumstances, and others may have no impact at all.” 22 And
a general problem with short-term event studies of staggered boards is that
short-term stock returns may bundle the market’s assessment of staggered
boards with the market’s inferences of other ﬁrm news that might explain
both the adoption of a staggered board and the change in ﬁrm value. 23
A different approach to evaluating the wealth effects of staggered boards is
studying their cross-sectional association with long-term firm value. 24 The 2005
study by Bebchuk and Cohen25 is arguably the best known among the studies
adopting this methodology. The BC study examines an eight-year span, from
1995 to 2002. 26 Using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value,27 BC conclude that
having a staggered board is associated with statistically and economically
significant lower firm value,28 which has been interpreted to support the view
that staggered boards hurt shareholders. 29
Cross-sectional studies of staggered boards, however, are particularly hard to
interpret given the endogeneity of board structures. Indeed, the adoption or
removal of a staggered board is an endogenous choice made by firms given
particular circumstances at the time of adoption. 30 Under this constraint, a crossSee Cremers & Sepe, supra note 2, at 88-92 (discussing earlier staggered board studies in details).
Id.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 89-90.
Id. at 90.
Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 13.
Id. at 410.
Tobin’s Q has become the standard proxy for the ﬁnancial value of the corporation in
corporate ﬁnance studies. See id. at 419-20. Tobin’s Q is, roughly, the ratio of the market value of
assets to the book value of assets. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Testing Trade-Oﬀ and
Pecking Order Predictions About Dividends and Debt, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 1, 8 (2002).
28 Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 13, at 410.
29 E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1681-86 (2013).
30 See generally JEFFREY M. WOOLRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN
APPROACH 444-45 (4th ed. 2009) (describing cross-sectional analysis).
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
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sectional analysis can provide useful snapshots of the association between the level
of staggered boards and firm value over different years, identifying to what extent
firms with a staggered board in place tend to have different financial valuations at
particular points in time from other firms without a staggered board at that time.
However, a cross-sectional analysis is ill-suited to capture temporal variations
in board structure within the same set of firms, even if such analysis combines
multiple years in a pooled panel. This is because changes in board structure tend
to be relatively rare. As a result, the impact of any “within-firm” changes in board
structure on firm value in a cross-sectional study is generally overwhelmed by
differences in firm value “across firms.” In other words, cross-sectional studies
only tend to capture differences between different sets of firms, namely firms
with and without a staggered board, and not how changes in board structure
relate to changes in firm value within one firm.
This explains why a cross-sectional analysis is especially subject to
endogeneity concerns where differences in firm value might be attributable to
unobservable firm characteristics (an “omitted variable” problem), or where low
firm value might motivate, rather than result from, the adoption of a staggered
board (a particular form of a “selection problem,” generally known as the “reverse
causality” problem).31
In CLS we show that one important variable that the BC study omits is the
ex ante value of the firms that adopt a staggered board. 32 Controlling for the
relatively low value of firms prior to the adoption of a staggered board shows that
the negative cross-sectional association between having a staggered board and
firm value can indeed be attributed to a reverse causality problem. This means
that firms with lower ex ante value are more likely to adopt a staggered board,
rather than the adoption of a staggered board causing firms to have a lower value.
B. Recent Studies
In recent years, a surge of new studies have examined the wealth effects of
staggered boards. 33 Unlike earlier studies, several of these studies find that
staggered boards serve a positive governance function for different subsets of
firms. For example, Professors Johnson, Karpoff, and Yi document that staggered
boards have a positive impact on firm value in both IPO and young publicly traded
firms (i.e., in the years immediately following the IPO), especially for firms with
31 See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL
DATA 50-51 (2002) (providing a general discussion of the specificity and simultaneity problems).
32 Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 433-34.
33 For a description of these studies, see Daniel M. Gallagher & Joseph A. Grundfest, Did
Harvard Violate Federal Securities Law?: The Campaign Against Classified Boards of Directors, 33-41
(Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 199, 2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2536586.
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stronger stakeholder relationships. 34 Professors Cen, Dasgupta, and Sen similarly
find that staggered boards serve a positive governance function in firms where
stakeholder relationships are important.35
Our 2017 study (CLS) focuses on more mature firms and examines over thirtyfive years of staggering and destaggering decisions (from 1978 to 2015),
documenting that firm value tends to increase (decrease) after firms adopt
(remove) a staggered board, especially in firms more engaged in research and
innovation or where stakeholder relationships matter more.36 As the primary
identification strategy to address the endogenous choice of a staggered board, CLS
employs a time-series analysis that considers how changes in board structure
predict changes in firm value.37 More particularly, CLS employs two different
time-series methodologies: (1) pooled panel regressions of firm value on board
structure with firm fixed effects and (2) regressions of changes in firm value on
changes in board structure.
The first methodology—pooled panel regressions of firm value on board
structure with firm fixed effects—allows us to estimate for each firm included in a
panel dataset, the coefficient of a separate time-invariant dummy variable that
captures the average value of each particular firm in the sample. Thus, once firm
fixed effects are included, the coefficient on the staggered board is only identified
through changes in board structure, and indicates the difference in average firm
value before versus after a change in board structure. That is, the coefficient
indicates how the average firm value changes after the adoption/removal of a
staggered board within the same firm, rather than across firms. Because this
methodology significantly mitigates both the omitted variable problem and reverse
causality concerns, a time-series analysis with firm fixed effects is generally
regarded as a more reliable method of identifying empirical relationships in
econometrics than a cross-sectional analysis. More particularly, a time-series
analysis is regarded as especially good at preventing spurious associations that are
not really there but are only apparent because some important controlling variable
is not included.38
However, because changes in board structure are relatively rare, only when
data are available for considerable lengths of time can researchers count on having
sufficient within firm changes in board structure to perform a time-series analysis.
34 William C. Johnson, Jonathan M. Karpoﬀ & Sangho Yi, The Bonding Hypothesis of Takeover
Defenses: Evidence from IPO Firms, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 307, 329 (2015).
35 Ling Cen, Sudipto Dasgupta & Rik Sen, Discipline or Disruption? Stakeholder Relationships and
the Eﬀect of Takeover Threat, 62 MGMT. SCIENCE 2820, 2820 (2016).
36 Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 423.
37 Id.
38 See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman & William E. Taylor, Panel Data and Unobservable Individual
Eﬀects, 49 ECONOMETRICA 1377, 1377 (1981) (stating that using ﬁxed eﬀects represents a common
method of controlling for omitted variables).
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Furthermore, as pooled panel regressions of firm value with firm fixed effects
estimate how the average firm value changes, such estimation may be noisy in
periods when firm values fluctuate substantially in ways that are not highly
systematic. As a result, pooled panel regressions of firm value with firm fixed
effects may have “poor power,” i.e., have a poor ability to identify an association
of board structure with firm value that is actually present in the data if the sample
is too short, too noisy, or has too few changes in board structure.
The second time-series methodology we employ in CLS—regressions of
changes in firm value on changes in board structure—allows us to control for
changes in other firm characteristics that the previous literature found to be related
to firm value. Similar to the coefficient on board structure in pooled panel
regressions with firm fixed effects, the coefficient of changes in board structure
estimated in change in firm value regressions is only identified from changes in
board structure; that is, from cases where firms adopt or remove a staggered board.
However, firm fixed effect regressions estimate differences in the average firm
value before versus after changes in board structure. Instead, change-in-value
regressions estimate whether firm value changes immediately following the change in
board structure, where it is possible that such changes would subsequently be
reversed (e.g., due to other, perhaps unrelated, changes affecting the firm). Further,
in change-in-value regressions, changes to firm value following changes in board
structure are not compared to firm value in the full period before the change in
board structure but only to firm value closely prior to the change in board structure.
It follows that change-in-firm-value regressions can more easily pick up timeseries associations in shorter samples—that is, this methodology has more power
to find an association in samples that are shorter, noisier or with fewer changes. Yet,
a potential downside of change-in-firm-value regressions is that the estimated
changes may not be permanent, unlike the changes that are captured through the
use of firm fixed effects in a sufficiently long sample. This explains why one should
employ both methodologies whenever possible, as each methodology has different
advantages and drawbacks.
In addition to using these time-series methodologies, CLS conﬁrms the
positive association between the adoption of a staggered board and ﬁrm value
through several other identiﬁcation strategies. As we discuss in more detail
in Part IV, these strategies include the use of matched samples, a quasi-natural
experiment employing a 1990 change in Massachusetts’s legislation on
staggered boards, and a simultaneous-system approach that dynamically
models endogenous changes in ﬁrm value, board structure, and other ﬁrm
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characteristics. 39 Further, the main result in CLS is also consistent with the
results we obtain in several other related studies. 40
C. Settling the Debate?
As highlighted in the Introduction, ASDS defends the view that staggered
boards have no significant association with firm value. They reach this conclusion
by examining the cross-sectional and time-series association of firm value and board
structure in a sample of nearly 3,000 firms from 1990 to 2013 and, purportedly,
showing that “prior studies [finding either a negative association or a positive
association between staggered boards and firm value] are not robust to different
estimation models.”41 More particularly, ASDS focus on BC as the most prominent
among earlier studies and CLS as the most comprehensive among more recent
studies analyzing the association between firm value and board structure.42
ASDS’s methodological criticism of BC, which substantially replicates our own
prior criticism of that study,43 is that BC omit important explanatory variables in
their analysis that affect both the likelihood of adopting a staggered board and firm
value.44 ASDS replicate BC’s cross-sectional analysis in a sample covering 1990–
2013, finding that the negative association between staggered boards and firm value
becomes insignificant when they add more controls.45 They then show that the
other entrenchment provisions included in the E-index developed by Bebchuk,
Cohen, and Ferrell,46 as well as ex ante low firm value, are important omitted
variables in BC’s analysis.47 These results are, again, fully consistent with similar
tests we performed in CLS as well as the 2016 legal companion of that article, The
Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards. 48

See Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 423-24 (describing these additional tests).
See Cremers et al., CEO Pay Redux, supra note 5, at 247-48 (examining the interplay between
CEO pay and staggered boards); Cremers et al., Commitment, supra note 5, at 732, 761-74 (challenging
the inclusion of the staggered board among the provisions that produce value-decreasing
entrenchment); K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Institutional Investors, Corporate
Governance, and Firm Value, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 387, 415-16 (2018) (examining the interplay
between staggered boards and institutional investor horizons); Cremers & Sepe, supra note 2
(examining the time period 1978–2011 and documenting that staggered boards are associated with a
positive increase in firm value by employing a time-series analysis with firm fixed effects).
41 Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1477.
42 Id. at 1478-79.
43 See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
44 Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1489-95.
45 Id. at 1490-91 tbl.1.
46 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22
REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 784-85 (2009).
47 Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1492 tbl.2, 1496 tbl.3.
48 Cremers & Sepe, supra note 2.
39
40
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ASDS then moves to the methodological criticism of CLS: that a time-series
analysis with firm fixed effects does not “account for the changing nature of the
firm over time.”49 They argue:
[S]ome firm characteristics change over time . . . and these changes may induce
firms to adopt a staggered board or to destagger their board, while at the same
time affecting firm value. The reason for the earlier results [in CLS] may be
related to unobserved changing characteristics . . . which caused the relationship
between a staggered board and firm value. It may have been these changing
characteristics themselves rather than related changes in staggered board status
that affected value. 50

In order to test this criticism, ASDS first replicate the time-series analysis in
CLS over their 1991–2013 sample51 and then over two subsamples, 1991–2002 and
2003–2013. 52 The reason for splitting the sample, they say, is to “allow for the
unobserved firm characteristics to vary over time and have their own effect on
value . . . .” 53
The results of ASDS Table 4 show that in the full ASDS sample (covering
1991–2013), the impact of staggered board on firm value is generally positive and
statistically significant. 54 However, once they split their full sample in two, they
find that the effect of the staggered board on firm value becomes statistically
insignificant in both subsamples (covering 1991–2002 and 2003–2013
respectively).
They then conclude:
Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1475.
Id. at 1498.
It it is also worth emphasizing that ASDS’s controlled full sample is approximately half of our
controlled full sample in CLS. In fact, the statistically significant results they find in the specifications
for their full sample are consistent with the results for the subsample (1996–2015) examined in Table 3,
Column 6 of our JFE paper. Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 429.
52 Amihud et al., supra, note 6, at 1500 tbl.4.
53 Id. at 1498.
54 Id. at 1500. In ASDS Table 4, column 1 (i.e., the model without ownership variables and without
the Modified E-Index), ASDS find a positive staggered board coefficient with a t-statistics of 1.596,
which is only marginally insignificant. Id. (If the t-statistics were 1.645 or higher, they should have
reported a significant result also for that specification.) However, we cannot fully replicate this result.
Indeed, if we use our sample and specifications as in Table 3 of CLS—Q regressions with firm and fixed
effects and only basic controls—but then restrict our sample to 1991-2013 (as in ASDS), we find a
statistically significant coefficient of Staggered Board equal to 0.075 with a t-statistic of 2.11. Using
analogous regressions but using log(Q) as in ASDS, we find a statistically significant coefficient of
Staggered Board equal to 0.034 with a t-statistic of 2.25. Our sample size of 24,413 observations in these
regressions is very similar to the sample size of 24,295 that ASDS report for column 1 of their Table 4.
See id. One possible explanation for the difference between ASDS’s results and our replication is that
ASDS may use staggered board data that are qualitatively different than ours. For example, ASDS report
using the staggered board data from IRRC, which is only updated bi-annually before 2006. Id. at 148788. In our dataset, instead, we hand-checked changes in board structure in the missing years (e.g., 2001,
2003, and 2005). See infra Section III.A.
49
50
51
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In sum, the evidence on the value of staggered boards is mixed. Bebchuk,
Cohen, and others have found a staggered board has a wealth-decreasing
eﬀect; Cremers, Litov, Sepe, and others have found a staggered board has a
wealth-increasing eﬀect. The diﬀerences between the studies is attributable
to the diﬀerent methods they employ to account for omitted variables . . . . 55

Before discussing ASDS’s specific criticisms of CLS, we note here that
ASDS’s conclusion about existing staggered board studies is only partially
accurate. While the different results in BC and CLS can certainly be attributed to
different estimation methods, ASDS omits the substantial difference between
identifying a cross-sectional versus a time-series association. Specifically, BC rely
on a cross-sectional study to examine the association of staggered boards with firm
value over an eight-year period. CLS, instead, employ a time-series analysis over a
much longer thirty-seven-year period. The difference between these methodologies,
as explained above, reflects a fundamentally improved identification strategy,
which amounts to the difference between comparing different firms with different
board structures in a cross-sectional analysis, and comparing changes within the
same firm that modifies its board structure in a time-series analysis. It follows that
the time-series evidence of CLS—namely that firm value tends to increase
(decrease) after firms adopt (remove) a staggered board—should be distinguished
from prior cross-sectional results that are more subject to endogeneity (or
selection) concerns,56 rather than ambiguously concluding that the current
evidence on staggered boards is “mixed.”
II. ON THE ROBUSTNESS OF RECENT STUDIES
In this Part, we examine ASDS’s main criticism of CLS—that our results are
not robust in taking into account the changing nature of firm characteristics over
time. We begin our discussion by detailing some preliminary observations
concerning their analysis. After that, we will explain that the ASDS methodology
of examining our results in fairly short subperiods involves an important tradeoff,
which ASDS omits to discuss. On the one hand, splitting a longer sample into
shorter subperiods—as ASDS do when they split their 1991–2013 full sample in
two subperiods for 1991–2001 and 2002–2013—allows one to better control for
changes in unobserved firm characteristics, addressing an important endogeneity
concern. On the other hand, however, using two subperiods and analyzing those
periods independently assumes that there is nothing we can learn across periods.
More importantly, doing so has the downside of making less data available,
resulting in a loss of statistical power and weakening the ability of a model with

55
56

Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1484.
See supra Section I.A.
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firm fixed effects—such as that employed in ASDS to replicate CLS—to find an
association even when such association is actually supported by the data.
A. Preliminary Observations
The first preliminary observation concerns the sample ASDS employ in
replicating the pooled panel regressions with firm fixed effects in CLS. Their
sample covers the period 1991–2013, while our sample is much longer and covers
the period 1978–2015. Further, they state that “from 1990–2006, [ASDS] follow
Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrell, Gompers, Ishii, Metrick, and others by
assuming a firm’s governance provisions as reported in a given IRRC volume
remained in place during the period following the publication of the volume until
the publication of the subsequent volume.”57
Conversely, the CLS study handchecked all missing years that were skipped by
the IRRC volumes, incorporating many changes that occurred during the years in
which IRRC did not update their data.58 In particular, for those firms, the changes
in board structure actually occurred one year before the changes appear in any
IRRC volume. While we do not have the exact data used in ASDS, we demonstrate
below that the positive time-series association between firm value and staggered
boards is stronger in our sample even when we restrict it to exactly the same period
as used in ASDS and have otherwise the same specifications, suggesting that
differences in board structure data may be the cause of some of the different results
in CLS and ASDS.
A second preliminary observation concerns the econometric specification
employed in ASDS. Unlike BC and CLS, which use a linear-linear (or level-level)
model, where firm value is proxied by Tobin’s Q, ASDS uses a log-level model by
employing the logarithmic transformation of Tobin’s Q.59 Using the log-linear
functional form does not change much, as the correlation between Q and log(Q) in
the sample is approximately ninety-seven percent. Intuitively, the log(Q)
specification reduces the influence of outlier observations: here, the influence of
firms with high values of Q. In CLS, as in most of the literature, Q itself is the
dependent variable, and the influence of outliers is reduced through winsorizing
the data.60 When we use log-level specifications (i.e., with the log of Q as the
dependent variable) in our sample, our results become even more significant,
economically and statistically. Therefore, this Essay’s use of a level-level model—
that is, the use of Q as the dependent variable rather than the log of Q, as in
ASDS—should be interpreted as a conservative strategy.

57
58
59
60

Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1488.
See Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 424-25.
Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1489.
See Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 427.
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B. Data and Subsamples
While ASDS end their sample in 2013, for consistency with CLS, in this Essay
we use data up to 2015. However, we verified that our results remain similar if we
end the sample in 2013, as in ASDS.
The “correction” ASDS employs for the alleged inability of our model with
firm fixed effects to “account for the changing nature of the firm over time” 61 is
splitting the full sample in two, arguing that this is useful to “allow for the
unobserved firm characteristics to vary over time and have their own effect on
value . . . .”62 It is thus important to understand the implications of this test in
full. Figure 1 of CLS, which we reproduce below and which shows the percentage
of firms with a staggered board in 1978–2015 in our sample, helps to the task.
FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS WITH A
STAGGERED BOARD IN 1978–2015
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Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1475.
Id. at 1498.
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As shown by Figure 1, there are two major trends in board structure variation
in the sample: one from 1978 to 1990, with many firms adopting a staggered board,
and a second from 2003 (more rapidly from 2005) to 2015, with many firms
removing a staggered board. In the period 1991–2002 there is, instead, very little
time variation in board structure, as very few firms either adopted or removed a
staggered board over this period.
These trends matter because, as noted above,63 the purpose of employing a
time-series analysis with firm fixed effects in examining the value implications of
staggered boards is to allow empiricists to compare the average Q before versus after
a change in board structure, which emphasizes the importance of having sufficient
time variation in a panel to accurately estimate such changes in valuation over time.
It follows that in a time-series analysis, we should expect to find no significant
association between Q and board structure during the period 1991–2002—even if
such association was present in the actual data—as Figure 1 shows that there is very
little variation in board structure during that period. This means, as we discuss in
more details in CLS,64 that in the time-series we cannot derive any inference about
the value implications of staggered boards during that period.
This conclusion makes the choice of ASDS subsamples hard to understand, as
their first subsample (1991–2002) covers exactly the period for which CLS
document almost no time-series variation in board structure. It is thus unsurprising
that they find no statistically significant results for the first subsample. We
accordingly ignore the results for that subsample and focus on the second ASDS
subsample, spanning from 2003 to 2013 (2003 to 2015 in our reply, where we use the
full available data).
C. Firm Fixed Eﬀects Regressions and Change in Q Regressions
In examining the ASDS results for the subsample starting in 2003, we begin
again with a few preliminary observations. The general idea behind employing
smaller subperiods is that doing so provides a robustness check to results obtained
for a longer period. However, doing so also reduces the amount of data available
for the estimation by limiting both time variation in board structure and the
amount of data available for estimating average levels of Q. This implies that using
firm fixed effects regressions with only eleven years, as ASDS do for the second
subsample, may so reduce the statistical power of firm fixed effects regressions as
to make this methodology unable to identify any association between staggered
boards and firm value, even if there is actually one present in the data. As explained
above, employing regressions of changes in firm value on changes in board
See supra Section I.B.
CLS also includes a very instructive ﬁgure (Figure 2) showing the cohorts of staggering up
and staggering down. Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 429-30.
63
64
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structure can mitigate this limitation, but ASDS do not consider CLS’s use of this
additional methodology.
1. Firm Fixed Eﬀects Regressions
With these observations in mind, we first examine the robustness of CLS’s
results for pooled panel Q regressions with firm fixed effects in Table 1, Panel A
below. We start in Column 1 with the 1996–2015 sample, which we use as
our reference regression, finding a statistically significant positive timeseries association between staggered boards and firm value. We start in
1996 rather than 1993 (as in ASDS) mainly because the subsample period
1996–2015 is exactly the same we use in CLS, when we split our own full
sample in two (i.e., 1978–1995 and 1996–2015). 65 We verify, however, that
our results remain statistically significant if we start the sample earlier
(e.g., in 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, or 1995).
We then report the results for the additional following subsamples: 1997–2015,
1998–2015, 1999–2015, 2000–2015, 2001–2015, 2002–2015, and 2003–2015. We find
that when we start the subsample in 2000 or earlier, rather than in 2003 as in ASDS,
the association between staggered boards and firm value remains positive and
statistically significant. Only if we start the sample in 2001, 2002, or 2003, does the
coefficient of Staggered Board (i.e., the dummy variable indicating that the firm has
a staggered board) become insignificant, as in ASDS.
Next, in Table 1, Panel B, we use the ASDS specification with the log-level
model (log(Q)). With this different specification, the staggered board results
remain significant when the sample starts in 2001 or earlier. This means that if
ASDS had started their second subsample in 2001 rather than 2003 in their
regressions of Table 4, they would presumably have found a positive and statistically
significant coefficient. We also observe that the t-statistics with the logtransformation of Q are generally higher, confirming that the level-level model that
we use is a conservative choice.

65

Id. at 429 tbl.3, col.6.
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TABLE 1: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS

This table presents annual pooled panel Q regressions on Staggered Board with firm and
year fixed effects (f.e.). All specifications include the following regression variables: Staggered
Board[t-1], Ln(Assets)[t-1], Delaware incorporation[t-1], ROA[t-1], CAPX/Assets[t-1], R&D/ Sales[t-1], and
Industry M&A volume[t-1]. 66 We use Q as the dependent variable in Panel A, and log(Q) in
Panel B. In each column, we use a different time period, starting with 1996–2015 in column
(1), which replicates the result in column (6) of Table 3 in CLS. We only show the coefficient
of Staggered Board[t-1] in order to save space. T-statistics (in their absolute value) are based on
robust standard errors clustered by firm and presented in parentheses below the coefficients.
Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **,
and *, respectively.

Panel A. Pooled Panel Regressions Using Q
Dependent variable: Q[t]
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

1996–
2015
0.098****
(2.72)

1997–
2015
0.103***
(2.88)

1998–
2015
0.097***
(2.75)

1999–
2015
0.087***
(2.59)

2000–
2015
0.067**
(2.06)

2001–
2015
0.051
(1.58)

2002–
2015
0.038
(1.22)

2003–
2015
0.024
(0.81)

Control included

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm + year f.e.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

21,454

20,593

19,733

18,561

17,473

16,359

15,261

13,866

Adj. R2

0.758

0.760

0.763

0.773

0.784

0.791

0.795

0.807

Period:
Staggered board[t-1]

Ln(Assets)[t-1] is the log of the book value of total assets; Delaware incorporation[t-1] is a dummy variable
indicating if the firm is incorporated in Delaware; ROA[t-1] is the return on assets calculated as the ration of
the firm’s EBITDA142 over the book value of total assets; CAPX/Assets[t-1] is the ratio of capital expenditures
over the book value of total assets; R&D/ Sales[t-1] is the ratio of research and development expenditures over
sales; and Industry M&A volume[t-1] is the ratio of mergers and acquisitions’ dollar volume in SDC to the total
market capitalization from CRSP per Fama-French 49 industries.
66
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Panel B. Pooled panel regressions using log(Q )
Dependent variable: log(Q[t])
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

1996–
2015

1997–
2015

1998–
2015

1999–
2015

2000–
2015

2001–
2015

2002–
2015

2003–
2015

0.045***

0.048***

0.046***

0.042***

0.034**

0.028*

0.021

0.017

(3.06)

(3.22)

(3.13)

(2.95)

(2.39)

(1.95)

(1.45)

(1.21)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Period:

Staggered board[t-1]

Control included
Firm + year f.e.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

21,454

20,593

19,733

18,561

17,473

16,359

15,261

13,866

Adj. R2

0.779

0.782

0.784

0.793

0.802

0.806

0.810

0.821

The trends in Figure 1 and the results in Table 1 cast doubt on the conclusion
that ASDS derive by splitting their sample in two. More generally, these findings
highlight how using separate subsamples with firm fixed effects is an extreme way
to deal with how associations might change over time. This is because, with firm
fixed effects, as discussed above,67 the regression’s coefficients are only identified
from within-firm time variation. Therefore, the smaller the time period
considered—and hence the fewer the changes in board structure contained in the
data and the more limited the availability of data to estimate how the average level
of Q has changed—the more difficult it is to identify any time-series associations
even if these associations do actually exist. Therefore, as we will explore in more
detail in Part III, a reasonable explanation for the insignificant time-series
association between firm value and board structure ASDS find when splitting the
sample in two is that models with firm fixed effects have “poor power”; that is, a
poor ability to find any association even if such association is actually present in the
data, especially when these models are employed over relatively short samples.
Also recall that once firm fixed effects are included, the coefficient of Staggered
Board captures the difference in the average Q before versus after changes in board
structure. Thus, when the ASDS 1991–2013 sample is split into the two sub-periods
of 1991–2002 and 2003–2013, changes in board structure that occur around the split
of 2002–2003 are removed from the data, no longer showing up as changes in board
structure in either of the separate samples. This further means that changes in 2004
67

See supra Section I.B.
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have only one observation of Q in the period before the change, rendering a
comparison between the average Q before and after the change considerably more
noisy. Moreover, changes in 2005 appear in the ASDS sample as changes in 2006,
as IRRC did not update their data in 2005.68 As a result, for the firms where the
board structure changed in 2005, the methodology in ASDS estimates the average
Q before the change as the average Q in 2003, 2004, and 2005 (controlling for other
firm characteristics in the regression, of course), though 2005 already covers the
period after the change in board structure.
2. Change-in-Q Regressions
A way to address the methodological limitation affecting firm-fixed-effects
regressions is using change-in-firm-value regressions to verify a time-series
association. Indeed, as we explained above, change-in-firm-value regressions can
more easily pick up time-series associations in shorter samples, because changes in
firm value are not compared to the average firm value in the full period before the
change in board structure, but only to the firm value closely prior to the change in
board structure.
Using change-in-Q regressions, CLS obtains similar results to the firm-fixedeffects regressions for the full 1978–2015 sample, with an increase (decrease) in Q
after a firm adopts (removes) a staggered board, and where the changes in Q are
not immediate but materialize in the second year after the change in board
structure.69 In Table 2 below, we thus use the same methodology as in CLS of
regressing the changes in Q from one to three years after the change in board
structure for the same sub-samples as in Table 1 (1996–2015, 1997–2015, 1998–2015,
1999–2015, 2000–2015, 2001–2015, 2002–2015, and 2003–2015).

68
69

See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
Cremers et al., supra note 6, at 431 tbl.4.
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TABLE 2: CHANGES IN FIRM VALUE AND CHANGES
IN STAGGERED BOARDS
This table presents pooled panel first difference regressions with the dependent variable
being the change in Q from t to t+1 in Panel A (i.e., ∆ Q[t, t+1]), the change in Q from t to t+2
in Panel B (i.e., ∆ Q[t, t+2]), and the change in Q from t to t+3 in Panel C (i.e., ∆ Q[t, t+3]). The
dependent variables have been demeaned with their annual cross-sectional averages. As
independent variables, we include the following: ∆ Staggered Board[t-1,t], ∆ Ln(Assets)[t-1,t], ∆
ROA[t-1,t], ∆ CAPX/Assets[t-1,t], ∆ R&D/Sales[t-1,t], and ∆ Industry M&A volume[t-1,t]. In each
column, we use a different time period, starting with 1996–2015 in column (1), which
replicates the result in columns (7)–(9) of Table 4 in CLS. We only show the coefficient of
∆ Staggered Board[t-1] in order to save space. All variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. Tstatistics (in their absolute value) are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and
presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Statistical significance of the coefficients is
indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively.

Period:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

1996–
2015

1997–
2015

1998–
2015

1999–
2015

2000–
2015

2001–
2015

2002–
2015

2003–
2015

∆Staggered board[t-1]

0.00138
(0.06)

Panel A: Dependent variable: ∆ Q[t, t+1]
0.028
0.027
0.031
0.030
(1.13)
(1.12)
(1.35)
(1.28)

-0.004
(-0.17)

0.006
(0.25)

-0.001
(-0.06)

∆Staggered board[t-1]

0.0728*

Panel B: Dependent variable: ∆ Q[t, t+2]
0.094**
0.095**
0.094**
0.092**

0.082**

0.080**

0.074*

(1.82)

(2.43)

(2.26)

(2.18)

(1.95)

0.135***

Panel C: Dependent variable: ∆ Q[t, t+3]
0.123***
0.123***
0.131***
0.138***

0.120**

0.113**

0.112**

(2.91)

(2.88)

(2.50)

(2.35)

(2.15)

∆Staggered board[t-1]

(2.47)

(2.86)

(2.37)

(2.85)

(2.33)

(3.02)

Consistent with our criticism of the results in ASDS (and consistent with our
prior results in CLS), Table 2, Panel A shows that the average change in Q a year
after the change in board structure is insignificant, but it becomes consistently
positive and statistically significant in the second and third years after the change
in board structure, for all periods considered (including 2003–2015, for which the
firm fixed effects results are insignificant). It is also worth highlighting that the
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effect on firm value is monotonically increasing over time after the change in board
structure. In particular, even when we only use the 2003–2015 time period, we find
that after the adoption (or dismissal) of a staggered board, the value of Q increases
(decreases) over time, where the changes in Q are strongly significant three years
after the change in board structure.70
We thus conclude that the results in Table 1 and Table 2 of this Essay contradict
the ASDS criticism of the results in CLS about the positive time-series association
between firm value and staggered boards, showing that CLS’s results are robust
III. THE PURPORTED INSIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATION OF STAGGERED
BOARDS AND FIRM VALUE
In this Part, we employ the bootstrapping methodology, which uses random
sampling techniques to estimate the statistical properties of an estimator,71 to
further explore the claims in ASDS and the validity of the results in CLS.
This advanced methodology shows, first, that firm-fixed-effects regressions
and change-in-value regressions are not more likely to find evidence for any
association if no such association is actually present in the data; that is, both these
tests have good statistical “size.” Second, the use of bootstrapping also confirms
that the difference in results for firm-fixed-effects regressions and change-in-Q
70 A further criticism of ASDS deserves attention here. ASDS observe that the conclusion that staggered
boards have no impact on firm value is consistent with the results obtained in another of our staggered board
studies, Board Declassification Activism: The Financial Value of the Shareholder Right Project (the SRP study).
See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Board Declassification Activism: The Financial
Value of the Shareholder Rights Projects (June 2017) (working paper), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2962162. In that work, we employ the
declassification activity of the Harvard Shareholder Rights Project (SRP)—a clinical program at
Harvard Law School assisting institutional investors with submitting board declassification proposals
during the period 2011–2014—as a quasi-natural experiment to examine the value implications of
staggered boards. In other words, we treat the SRP’s activity as a source of exogenous variation in
recent declassification campaigns to test the wealth effects of staggering/destaggering activity while
mitigating well-known endogeneity concerns. Consistent with the results in CLS, we find that
declassifying SRP targets declined in value after declassification. In ASDS’s words, however, the SRP
study would ultimately contradict the results in CLS as it also finds that “destaggering has no significant effect
on the value of firms not targeted by the Harvard Rights Project.” Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1501.
However, we have explained elsewhere why this is an inaccurate interpretation of that study’s results. See
Martijn K.J. Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Board Declassification Activism: Why Run Away from the Evidence?
(June 2017) (working paper), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2991854
(replying to criticism of the SRP study by Lucian Bebchuk and Alma Cohen). If one wants to focus on results
for non-SRP declassifications, one should do so in conjunction with the evidence in CLS, as the non-SRP
declassifications in the SRP study are only a small subset of the declassifications studied in CLS. Accordingly,
under the argument that non-SRP declassifications matter independently from SRP declassifications—which
ASDS seem to accept—the results in the SRP study need to be interpreted jointly with the results for the
much longer sample in CLS. Performing this analysis shows that the results in the SRP study are fully
consistent with the evidence in CLS. See id.
71 An estimator is the methodology one uses to estimate a given empirical association, i.e., in
this case the association between staggered boards with ﬁrm value.
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regressions over shorter sample periods can be explained by the difference in the
statistical “power” of each methodology. Indeed, the change-in-value regressions
have substantially better statistical power than the firm-fixed-effects regressions
and hence are more capable of finding a time-series association between firm value
and board structure.
Therefore, the analysis in this Part further confirms the validity of the results
in CLS and the lack of robustness of the ASDS results.
A. Bootstrapping and Statistical Inference
Before starting the discussion of the bootstrapping analysis of the results in
ASDS, in order to make this analysis accessible to a wide audience of nontechnical
readers, it is useful to briefly recap here some key statistical concepts. These
concepts include Type I and Type II errors, as well as the basic principles of using
bootstrapped samples to assess the size and power of statistical tests. To this end,
we start by considering the hypothesis that, as argued by ASDS, Q is not associated
with board structure, i.e., that the “true” coefficient of the staggered board in Q
regressions is equal to zero (the null hypothesis in ASDS). Type I errors occur when
the null hypothesis is true—in this case, when there is actually no association
between firm value and board structure—but one empirically rejects the null (false
positive). Instead, Type II errors occur when one does not reject the null hypothesis
and the null is actually false (false negative). Hence, here, a Type II error would
occur if one found no statistically significant association between firm value and
board structure but such association was actually present in the data.
According to ASDS, the results in CLS would have a high probability of
suffering from a Type I error, meaning that the methodologies used in CLS are
likely to find a statistically significant association between firm value and board
structure even if there is actually no such association in the data. Indeed, the high
likelihood of a Type I error is the reason in ASDS for both adding controls and
considering shorter subperiods. Conversely, our results from Table 1 and Table 2
above seem to suggest that the analysis in ASDS might suffer from a Type II error,
under which the methodology ASDS use does not allow them to find any
statistically significant association between firm value and board structure but such
association is actually present in the data.
In order to examine these opposite hypotheses, we start by employing the
bootstrapping methodology to test the “size” of both firm-fixed-effect regressions
and change-in-value regressions. A size test estimates how often one would find a
statistically significant coefficient in artificial samples, which are constructed
through bootstrapping to be very similar to the actual data, but in such a way that
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we know for a fact (i.e., by construction) that there is no actual association.72 We
then also employ the bootstrapping methodology to test the “power” of each
methodology, constructing bootstrapped samples for the “power” test in a very
similar way to the bootstrapped samples for the “size” test, except that in this case
we know for sure that in each bootstrapped sample there is, by design, a positive
association between firm value and board structure. 73
While a full discussion of the technicalities of bootstrapping is not within the
scope of this Essay, we hope to illustrate the intuition behind the size and power
tests by considering the following,
i. 𝑋𝑋0 : means finding no statistically significant time-series association
between Q and board structure in the data;
ii. 𝑋𝑋1 : means finding a statistically significant time-series association
between Q and board structure in the data;
iii. 𝑌𝑌0 : means the actual time-series association between Q and board
structure is zero; and
72 Speciﬁcally, each bootstrapped sample is constructed in the following way. We ﬁrst estimate
the regression of Q on Staggered Board plus the set of standard controls, exactly as in column 1 of
Table 1, Panel A above. Next, we decompose each observation of Q into (i) the part that is ﬁtted by
the regression coeﬃcients excluding the Staggered Board coeﬃcient (i.e., multiplying all other
coeﬃcients, including on all ﬁxed eﬀects, with the values of all variables), (ii) the part that is ﬁtted
by the regression coeﬃcient on Staggered Board (i.e., that coeﬃcient times the value of the Staggered
Board dummy variable), and (iii) the part of actual Q that is not explained by any of the variables,
including the Staggered Board indicator, the controls and all of the ﬁxed eﬀects, i.e., the residual part.
Second, each new sample consists of “artiﬁcial” values of Q that are constructed by combining
the ﬁrst and third part, but leaving out the second part. By construction, the ﬁrst and third parts are
statistically uncorrelated with the Staggered Board indicator, and thus the sum of the ﬁrst and third
part will be uncorrelated with the Staggered Board indicator as well. In each bootstrapped sample,
each ﬁrm’s ﬁrst part is combined with the full available history of the residual part of a randomly
chosen ﬁrm (with replacement, though results are identical when we randomly assign residual parts
without replacement), matched by year (such that the ﬁrst part for, e.g., the year 2006 is combined
with the residual part of a randomly chosen ﬁrm for 2006 as well).
Because a key feature of Tobin’s Q is that it tends to be persistent at the ﬁrm level and
heteroskedastic (i.e., the variance of the error terms diﬀer across ﬁrm, and residuals are correlated
within ﬁrms), in the procedure we retain the full correlation structure of the actual Tobin’s Q (of
the data) in our bootstrapped samples. The use of the full history of the residual part ensures that
the bootstrapped data will have similar cross-sectional and time-series correlations as the actual data.
Finally, we randomly assign a staggered board to ﬁrms in the sample, such that in each
bootstrapped sample, in each year the number of ﬁrms with a bootstrapped staggered board is equal
to the number of ﬁrms with a staggered board in the actual data, and such that the number of ﬁrms
adopting and removing a staggered board is as well equal to the actual data. In summary, the
bootstrapped samples for the size test that result are very similar to the actual data, except that we
know for sure that in each bootstrapped “artiﬁcial data” sample there is, by construction, no
association between ﬁrm value and the randomly assigned board structure.
73 This positive association is created by taking the bootstrapped samples from the “size” tests,
and permanently increasing (decreasing) the bootstrapped values of Q after a ﬁrm is randomly
assigned to adopt (remove) a staggered board, where our choices of the magnitude of these changes
are explained in more detail below.
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iv. 𝑌𝑌1 : means the actual time-series association between Q and board
structure is nonzero.
When an empiricist uses a methodology with “poor size,” then it is likely that
she finds 𝑋𝑋1 even if 𝑌𝑌0 is “true.” Put differently, if size is poor, then 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋1 |𝑌𝑌0 )—
the probability of 𝑋𝑋1 conditional on 𝑌𝑌0 —is high. On the other hand, if size is
strong, then it is very unlikely that one would find 𝑋𝑋1 if 𝑌𝑌0 is “true,” that is,
𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋1 |𝑌𝑌0 ) is very low. In brief, only if size is strong, it is reasonable to conclude
that the data supports 𝑌𝑌1 , if you find 𝑋𝑋1 . But if size is poor, then finding 𝑋𝑋1 does
not allow one to conclude much, as it is likely that one finds 𝑋𝑋1 even if 𝑌𝑌0 is true.
Therefore, if the models in CLS were shown to have strong size, this would add to
the robustness of the conclusion in CLS that staggered boards matter for firm
value. Vice versa, if these models were shown to have poor size, the ASDS criticism
of the results in CLS would be more likely to be accurate.
Correspondingly, when an empiricist uses a test with “poor power,” it is likely
that one can find 𝑋𝑋0 even if 𝑌𝑌1 is “true” (meaning that scholars may not find an
association between staggered boards and firm value even if such association is
actually present in the data). That is, if power is poor, then 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋0 |𝑌𝑌1 )—the
probability of 𝑋𝑋0 conditional on 𝑌𝑌1 —is high. Correspondingly, this implies that if
power is poor, then finding 𝑋𝑋0 should not be interpreted as strong evidence for 𝑌𝑌0 .
On the other hand, if power is strong, then it is very unlikely that one can find 𝑋𝑋0
if 𝑌𝑌1 is “true,” that is, 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋0 |𝑌𝑌1 ) is low. In brief, only if power is strong, it is
reasonable to conclude that the data support 𝑌𝑌0 if you find 𝑋𝑋0 . But if power is poor,
then finding 𝑋𝑋0 does not allow one to conclude much. Therefore, only if the model
in ASDS was shown to have strong power, their conclusion that staggered boards
do not matter for firm value would likely be robust, while if the ASDS model had
poor power, this would cast doubt on their conclusion.
On these assumptions, we run 10,000 bootstrapped samples across firm-fixedeffects regressions and change-in-value regressions. As shown below, our bootstrap
results contradict the claim in ASDS that these methodologies likely find a
statistically significant association even when in actuality there is none, as they show
that both methodologies as employed in CLS have good “size,” that is, do not suffer
from high Type I error. 74
Next, we show that the firm-fixed-effect regressions have poor power, that is, a
limited ability to find a statistically significant association even if the sample is
constructed such that there is an actual association between firm value and board
structure. However, we also find that the change-in-Q regressions have much better
power, indicating that one is much more likely to find a statistically significant
association if there is an actual association in the data. Consistent with our results
from Table 1 and Table 2 above, these results thus indicate that the only
74 More precisely, one could say that the likelihood that our results in CLS may suffer from a Type
I error falls within the confidence interval that we documented in both CLS and Tables 1 and 2 above.
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methodology considered by ASDS—namely regressions with firm fixed effects—
has poor power and hence a high likelihood of Type II error.
B. Size Test
The first bootstrapping test we run, presented in Table 3 below, is the size test
for the 1996–2015 sample of Table 1, Panel A, column 1. (However, the results are
similar if we use the sample 1993–2013 or 1991–2013 as in ASDS.) Recall that with
our procedure, the resulting bootstrapped samples are all very similar to the actual
data. This means that each sample has the same percentage of firms with a
staggered board in each calendar year, and the same number of firms staggering
down and staggering up each year, as in the actual data. However, the board
structure is randomly assigned such that there is actually no association between firm
value and board structure in the bootstrapped samples by construction.
TABLE 3: SIZE TEST—REGRESSIONS OF THE LEVEL OF Q
This table presents bootstrap results to test the size of the pooled panel Q regressions as
shown in column 1 of Table 1, Panel A. Each bootstrapped sample is constructed to be very
similar to the actual data, including the cross-sectional and time-series correlation structure,
as described in the text. We construct a total of 10,000 bootstrapped samples in which there
is no association between Q and Staggered Board. For each bootstrapped sample, we run a
pooled panel Q regression on Staggered Board[t-1], Ln(Assets)[t-1], Delaware incorporation[t-1],
ROA[t-1], CAPX/Assets[t-1], R&D/ Sales[t-1], and Industry M&A volume[t-1], with year and firm
fixed effects. In Panel A, we show the 0.5th, 1st, 2.5th, 5th, 95th, 99th and 99.5th percentile
of the coefficient of Staggered Board[t-1] and its t-statistic across all 10,000 pooled panel
regressions, based on robust standard errors that are clustered by firm. In Panel B, we report
the percentage of bootstrapped samples where the t-statistic of the coefficient of Staggered
Board[t-1] is smaller or larger than the standard critical values for double-sided tests at the 10%
level (+/- 1.645), 5% level (+/- 1.96), and 1% level (+/- 2.326).

Panel A. Percentiles of bootstrapped coeﬃcients and t-statistics of Staggered

Board[t-1]
Percentile
Coefficient
t-statistic

0.50%
-0.226
-2.55

1%
2.50%
-0.202 -0.169
-2.29
-1.92

5%
-0.140
-1.62

95%
97.50%
0.139
0.167
1.49
1.78

99%
99.50%
0.201
0.227
2.11
2.30
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Panel B. Percentage of bootstrapped t-statistics of Staggered Board[t-1]
below/above some critical values
Condition
t-statistic < -1.645
t-statistic < -1.96
t-statistic < -2.326

% of bootstraps
4.82%
2.21%
0.91%

t-statistic > 1.645
t-statistic > 1.96
t-statistic > 2.326

3.60%
1.53%
0.44%

Table 3, Panel A presents the percentiles of coefficient and t-statistics (which is
the measure of statistical significance) of staggered boards on Q for the pooled
panel regressions based on 10,000 bootstraps. In other words, we report how often
we find coefficients and t-statistics of a certain size in the set of 10,000 bootstraps.
As shown by Table 3, Panel A, we find a coefficient of the Staggered Board
indicator of -0.226 (or even more negative) in only 0.50% of the bootstrapped
samples. Similarly, we find a t-statistic of -2.55 (or even more negative) of the
Staggered Board coefficient in only 0.50% of the bootstrapped samples. Using 5% as
the level of statistical significance and using a two-sided test, we look at the values
for the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles. For the coefficient of the Staggered Board dummy,
we find that a coefficient as negative as -0.169 (or even more negative) or as positive
as 0.167 (or even more positive) occurs in no more than 5% of the bootstrapped
samples. For the t-statistic of the coefficient of the staggered board dummy, we find
that a t-statistic as negative as -1.92 (or even more negative) or as positive as 1.78
(or even more positive) occurs in no more than 5% of the bootstrapped samples.
Our bootstrapped samples thus indicate that our tests based on t-statistics have
good size. Indeed, when one finds a t-statistic above 2 in absolute value (as we found
in CLS and Table 1 above), it is quite rare for such a large t-statistic to occur in
bootstrapped samples where there is no actual association (recall that we ensured
that there is in fact no association by construction in each of these bootstrapped
samples). Otherwise this t-statistic would be less likely to occur than in 2.5% of
cases. We hence conclude that our pooled panel regressions have good size, which
means that it would be very unlikely that one would find a statistically significant
coefficient on the Staggered Board dummy using our pooled panel setup, if there was
actually no association between board structure and Q at all (i.e., if the ASDS null
hypothesis was “true”).
To substantiate this assertion, consider now Table 3, Panel B, where we count
the percentage of bootstrapped samples in which we would conclude that there is a
statistically significant coefficient using the default critical values for the t-statistic,
namely 1.645 for a double-sided test at the 10% confidence level, 1.96 for the 5%
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confidence level, and 2.326 for the 1% confidence level (in graphical terms, one, two,
and three stars after the coefficient, respectively).
Table 3, Panel B shows that only 2.21% of the bootstrapped samples generates
a t-statistic (of the coefficient of the Staggered Board dummy) that is -1.96 or more
negative, and only 1.53% have a t-statistic of 1.96 or higher. Therefore, using the 5%
confidence level (critical value of +/- 1.96), we would incorrectly conclude that there
is a significant coefficient in 2.21%+1.53% = 3.74% of cases, which is lower—and thus
better—than the 5% level allowed. This means that using the 5% confidence level
(critical value of +/- 1.96), the estimation of the probability of Type I error for CLS
is around 3.74%. In other words, there is only a 3.74% probability that CLS rejected
the null hypothesis (Q is not associated with board structure) when the null is
indeed “true.”
Next, in Table 4, we essentially perform the same tests as in Table 3 but
considering the change in Q regressions (see Table 2 above). For this test, we use
the same bootstrapped samples as those presented in Table 3, and then calculate 1year, 2-year and 3-year changes in Q (i.e., three different time-horizons).
TABLE 4: SIZE TESTS—REGRESSIONS OF CHANGES IN Q
This table presents bootstrap results to test the size of the pooled panel change in Q
regressions as shown in column (1) of Table 2. Each bootstrapped sample is constructed to
be very similar to the actual data, including the cross-sectional and time-series correlation
structure, as described in the text. We construct a total of 10,000 bootstrapped samples in
which there is no association between Q and Staggered Board. For each bootstrapped sample,
we run a pooled panel regression of the change in Q over the next 1, 2, or 3 years on ∆
Staggered Board[t-1,t], ∆ Ln(Assets)[t-1,t], ∆ ROA[t-1,t], ∆ CAPX/Assets[t-1,t], ∆ R&D/Sales[t-1,t], and ∆
Industry M&A volume[t-1,t]. We report the percentage of bootstrapped samples where the tstatistic of the coefficient of ∆ Staggered Board[t-1] is smaller or larger than the standard critical
values for double-sided tests at the 10% level (+/- 1.645), 5% level (+/- 1.96) and 1% level (+/2.326). The change in Q over the next 1, 2, or 3 years is captured by the variable ∆ Q[t, t+1], ∆
Q[t, t+2]) and ∆ Q[t, t+3]), respectively.
Dependent variable:

∆ Q[t, t+1]

∆ Q[t, t+2]

∆ Q[t, t+3]

Condition
t-statistic < -1.645
t-statistic < -1.96
t-statistic < -2.326

% of bootstraps
4.39%
4.19%
1.86%
2.20%
0.71%
0.76%

4.00%
1.97%
0.65%

t-statistic > 1.645
t-statistic > 1.96
t-statistic > 2.326

6.41%
3.53%
1.39%

4.17%
1.90%
0.62%

6.63%
3.70%
1.68%
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The results for the change in Q regressions show again that these tests have
good size. Over the 1-year, 2-year, and 3-year horizons, and using the 5% confidence
level (critical value of +/- 1.96), we would incorrectly conclude that the coefficient
of staggered board is significant only in (1.86+3.53=) 5.39%, (2.2+3.7=) 5.9%, and
(1.97+1.9) = 3.97% of the cases, respectively, all very similar to the 5% level.
C. Power Test
In this section, we report the results for the “power” test. In this test, we
generate bootstrapped samples where there is an association between adopting and
dismissing a staggered board and Q by construction. In other words, for the power
test we use samples that are constructed such that the level of Q permanently
increases (decreases) after a firm adopts (removes) a staggered board, and where
we test whether firm-fixed-effect regression and change-in-value regressions can
find this association. Recall that every year, a certain number of firms adopts and
dismisses a staggered board in the data. The number of firms in each bootstrapped
sample that adopts and dismisses a staggered board is the same as the number of
firms that do so in the actual data, for each calendar year.
We consider two scenarios: an immediate change in Q after a change in board
structure, and a gradual change in Q after a change in board structure. In both cases,
we consider only a symmetric change in Q, so that Q always increases after the
adoption of a staggered board by the same amount as Q decreases after a staggered
board’s removal. This choice is motivated by the finding in CLS that the
differences between changes in Q (in absolute value) for adoptions versus
dismissals of staggered boards are statistically insignificant.75 In particular:
i. in the first scenario of an immediate and permanent change in Q after a
change in board structure, the permanent change in Q is set equal to 0.098 (based
on Table 1, Panel A, column 1 above and Table 3, column 6 of CLS)76 for adoptions
and -0.098 for removals.
ii. in the second scenario of a gradual change in Q after a change in board
structure, we use the results of Table 4, columns 7, 8, and 9 of CLS77 and increase
Q for the first year after the change by 0.00138, for the second year by 0.0728, and
for the third year and thereafter by 0.135.
In Table 5, we show the results for pooled panel regressions where the “true”
coefficient of staggered board on firm value equals 0.098. (To save space, here we
only show the results for the immediate change, as the results for a gradual change
are basically the same.) In other words, we bootstrap 10,000 samples where the data
is constructed such that the adoption (dismissal) of a staggered board is associated
75
76
77

See Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 430.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 431.
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with an increase (decrease) in Q of 0.098, and report the percentage of
bootstrapped samples in which we would (correctly) conclude that the coefficient
of the Staggered Board indicator is statistically significant at various levels of
statistical significance using firm-fixed-effect regressions.
TABLE 5: POWER TESTS—REGRESSIONS OF THE LEVEL OF Q
This table presents bootstrap results to test the power of the pooled panel Q regressions
as shown in Table 1. Each bootstrapped sample is constructed to be very similar to the actual
data, including the cross-sectional and time-series correlation structure, as described in the
text. We construct a total of 10,000 bootstrapped samples in which there is an association
between Q and Staggered Board, where the data is constructed such that an adoption
(removal) of a staggered board is associated with an increase in Q of 0.098. For each
bootstrapped sample, we run a pooled panel Q regression on Staggered Board[t-1], Ln(Assets)[t1], Delaware incorporation[t-1], ROA[t-1], CAPX/Assets[t-1], R&D/ Sales[t-1], and Industry M&A
volume[t-1], with year and firm fixed effects. We report the percentage of bootstrapped
samples where the t-statistic of the coefficient of Staggered Board[t-1] is smaller or larger than
the standard critical values for double-sided tests at the 10% level (+/- 1.645), 5% level (+/1.96) and 1% level (+/- 2.326).
Condition
t-statistic < -1.645
t-statistic < -1.96
t-statistic < -2.326

% of bootstraps
0.47%
0.17%
0.05%

t-statistic > 1.645
t-statistic > 1.96
t-statistic > 2.326

18.68%
11.17%
5.23%

Table 5 indicates that the pooled panel regressions with firm fixed effects have
poor power, by showing that for samples with an actual association (here by
construction) between having a staggered board and Q, one would be unlikely to
find this association in the data using this estimator. Indeed, Table 5 shows that we
find a statistically significant coefficient that is positive at the 5% confidence level
(i.e. with a critical value of +/- 1.96) in only 11.17% of cases. This implies that, with
88.8% likelihood, we would reject any association between staggered boards and Q,
even if there were a “true,” strongly positive association in the data.
Correspondingly, this means that at the 5% confidence level (critical value of +/1.96), the probability of a Type II error is 88.8%.78
78

Figure 2, which is included in this document’s appendix, visualizes some of our bootstrap results as
reported in Table 5. In particular, Figure 2 presents the histogram of the bootstrapped coefficients of Staggered
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As shown by Table 6 below, the power test produces, instead, much improved
results when we use change in Q regressions. In this case, we show results for both
the first scenario, which considers a permanent, immediate change in Q after a
change in board structure (in Panel A), and the second scenario, which assumes a
gradual change in Q (in Panel B).
TABLE 6: POWER TESTS—REGRESSIONS OF CHANGES IN Q
This table presents bootstrap results to test the power of the pooled panel change in Q
regressions as shown in Table 2. Each bootstrapped sample is constructed to be very similar
to the actual data, including the cross-sectional and time-series correlation structure, as
described in the text. We construct a total of 10,000 bootstrapped samples in which there is
an association between Q and Staggered Board. For each bootstrapped sample, we run a
pooled panel regression of the change in Q over the next 1, 2, or 3 years on ∆ Staggered Board[t1,t], ∆ Ln(Assets)[t-1,t], ∆ ROA[t-1,t], ∆ CAPX/Assets[t-1,t], ∆ R&D/Sales[t-1,t], and ∆ Industry M&A
volume[t-1,t]. We report the percentage of bootstrapped samples where the t-statistic of the
coefficient of ∆ Staggered Board[t-1] is smaller or larger than the standard critical values for
double-sided tests at the 10% level (+/- 1.645), 5% level (+/- 1.96), and 1% level (+/- 2.326).
The change in Q over the next 1, 2, or 3 years is captured by the dependent variable ∆ Q[t, t+1],
∆ Q[t, t+2]), and ∆ Q[t, t+3]), respectively.

Panel A. Power tests assuming an immediate change in Q following a change in
board structure
Dependent variable:

∆ Q[t, t+1]

∆ Q[t, t+2]

∆ Q[t, t+3]

Condition
t-statistic < -1.645
t-statistic < -1.96
t-statistic < -2.326

% of bootstraps
0
0.03%
0
0.01%
0
0

0.04%
0.02%
0.01%

t-statistic > 1.645
t-statistic > 1.96
t-statistic > 2.326

84.10%
76.56%
65.77%

55.35%
43.98%
31.24%

68.38%
57.71%
44.97%

Board in Panel A and the bootstrapped t-statistics of Staggered Board in Panel B. The results in Panel A show
that the estimated coefficients of Staggered Board center around 0.098, consistent with the actual change in Q
after a change in board structure, while the results in Panel B show that these coefficients are estimated with
considerable noise or statistical uncertainty.
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Panel B. Power tests assuming a gradual change in Q following a change in
board structure
Dependent variable:

∆ Q[t, t+1]

∆ Q[t, t+2]

∆ Q[t, t+3]

Condition
t-statistic < -1.645
t-statistic < -1.96
t-statistic < -2.326

% of bootstraps
5.25%
0.06%
2.78%
0.02%
1.25%
0.01%

0.01%
0.00%
0.00%

t-statistic > 1.645
t-statistic > 1.96
t-statistic > 2.326

5.70%
2.79%
1.06%

76.45%
66.70%
54.38%

49.51%
37.92%
25.36%

Table 6, Panel A—for the immediate and permanent change scenario—shows
that the change in Q regressions have much better power than the pooled panel
regressions with firm fixed effects, but also that this power declines if we look at
longer horizons. This make sense when the change in Q is actually immediate, such
as in the bootstrapped samples used in Panel A, as in this case looking at longer
horizons only adds statistical noise.
The results in Table 6, Panel A imply that if the bootstrapped samples are such
that the “true” coefficient of Staggered Board equals 0.098, and using the 5%
confidence level (critical value of +/- 1.96), we would reject the null hypothesis of
no statistically significant association in 77% of cases over a 1-year horizon, 58% of
cases over a 2-year horizon, and 44% of cases over a 3-year horizon. In other words,
the regressions of changes in Q on changes in board structure would indicate a
statistically significant coefficient of Staggered Board over a 1-year horizon in about
77% of the cases (compared to about 11% for the firm-fixed-effects regressions).
Finally, Table 6, Panel B—for the gradual change scenario—corresponds to
what we find in the actual data (see Table 2 above). Recall that here the “true”
coefficient of Staggered Board equals 0.00138 for the 1-year change, 0.0728 for the 2year change, and 0.135 for the 3-year change (see Table 2, column 1 above).
As shown by Table 6, Panel B using the 5% confidence level (critical value of
+/- 1.96), there is, as expected, very low power to find the small 1-year change. This
is consistent with the results reported in Table 2 above (and in Table 4 of CLS),
where we show that the change in Q is significant only after the first year in the
change in the board structure. Conversely, the 2-year change of 0.0728 has
reasonably good power, and the 3-year change has even better power. More
specifically, with the 5 percent confidence level (critical value of +/- 1.96), we would
reject the null hypothesis of no statistically significant association in 66.7% of the
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cases. Hence, Table 6, Panel B naturally finds that power increases over longer
time-horizons, consistent with the “true” coefficient actually increasing over longer
time-horizons.
In summary, the power test indicates that if there is actually an association
between firm value and board structure, one would be considerably more likely to
find this association by using regressions of changes in Q on changes in board
structure than through firm-fixed-effects regressions. This is consistent with the
results presented above, where even for the shorter time period starting in 2003,
the change-in-Q regressions using actual data show a large, positive, and statistically
significant coefficient of Staggered Board, while the analogous results for the same
sample but using firm fixed effects regressions are insignificant. 79
Therefore, our bootstrapping tests confirm that the results in ASDS can be
explained by their use of a statistical methodology with poor power (i.e. firm
fixed effect regressions). It follows that their finding of insignificant results
when they use fairly short time periods cannot be interpreted as evidence against
an association between firm value and board structure, especially when another
methodology with much stronger statistical power (i.e., change-in-value
regressions) results in robust evidence for such association using exactly the
same data sample.
IV. ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS
As hinted above, CLS uses multiple identification strategies, in addition to
pooled panel regression with firm fixed effects and change-in-Q regressions, to
address the selection concerns that follow from the endogenous choice of board
structure. 80 In discussing CLS’s findings, however, ASDS exclusively focus on the
firm-fixed-effects pooled panel regressions, while ignoring the results for
regressions of changes in Q on changes in board structure, or the various other
tests CLS perform. In this last section, we offer a brief recap of these additional
tests, which all confirm the result of a positive association between staggered
boards and firm value.
In particular:
i. We confirm the positive impact of the staggered board though a stock
portfolio analysis, which can be interpreted as a long-term event study around
changes in board structure. 81 We present abnormal stock returns of monthly
portfolios of firms that have staggered up (in the long portfolio) and firms that
have staggered down (in the short portfolio) around board staggering and destaggering events in our sample of firms during the time period from 1978 to
79
80
81

See supra Section II.C.
See supra Section I.B.
See Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 430.
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2015.82 In particular, in the 12-12 portfolio (constructed so to hold stocks in the 12month period before the change in board structure until 12 months thereafter, for
a total of 24 months for each stock with a change in board structure), we obtained
positive and statistically significant alphas in the four-factor, three-factor, and
market factor models.83
ii. We incorporate possible selection effects through the creation of multiple
matched samples based on different matching procedures.84 In each matched
sample, each firm with a changing board structure (i.e., a “treated” firm) in a given
year is matched to a firm with the same ex ante board structure and similar
observable characteristics that relate to board structure, but which did not change
its board structure in that year (i.e., a “control” firm). 85 The matched samples
confirm the positive (negative) relation between the adoption (removal) of a
staggered board and firm value.86
ASDS briefly observe that CLS performs a “matched sample study.”87
However, they do not discuss this additional methodology, except for observing in
a footnote that results for matched samples “naturally depend on the quality of the
match between firms subject to the change in staggered board and those serving as
control firms.”88 For this reason, we employ four different matching procedures in
CLS,89 although ASDS do not discuss whether our matched samples are of
sufficient quality, or by what criteria to assess matching quality. In CLS we also
show detailed comparisons between treated and control firms, which indicate that
differences across these samples are consistently minor, both economically and
statistically.90 This is consistent with the assumption that the reliability of matched
samples in the staggered board context depend on the control firms matching
treated firms with changing board structures in essential characteristics but for the
changes in board structures.91 Of course, we welcome constructive criticism on the
quality of our matching, though in the meantime it is worth highlighting that
matching represents a worthwhile strategy to mitigate endogeneity concerns in the
staggered board debate.

82 Id.
83 Id. at 432 tbl.5.
84 Id. at 434.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 435 tbl.7.
87 Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1484.
88 Id. at 1485 n.32.
89 See Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note
90 Id.
91 Id.

5, at 434.
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iii. We employ the dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM)
estimator92 proposed by Arellano and Bover93 and Blundell and Bond.94 As
explained by Wintoki, Linck, and Netter,95 this methodology estimates a
simultaneous system in which firm value, board structure, and other key corporate
characteristics are all endogenous and dynamically interrelated. Using a system
where we can reject that the instruments are weak and that accounts for
unobservable heterogeneity using firm fixed effects, the dynamic GMM results
show a positive (negative) relation between adopting (removing) a staggered board
and firm value that is strongly statistically significant.96
iv. We conduct a long-term event study exploiting plausibly exogenous
variation in board structure due to changes in Massachusetts corporate law.97 In
1990, Massachusetts made staggered boards “quasi-mandatory” by requiring firms
incorporated in the state to adopt a staggered board by default and making it
difficult to opt out of this requirement. 98 In CLS, we thus compare the value of
Massachusetts firms in the few years before and after this legal change in a matched
sample of firms, where the control firms are incorporated outside of Massachusetts
but have a similar size, are in the same industry, and have the same board structure
as the Massachusetts firms. After the legal change, the value of the Massachusetts
firms increased more than the value of their control firms.99 While ASDS mention
older studies that use Massachusetts as a quasi-natural experiment or more recent
but still unpublished studies, they do not discuss CLS’s long-term event study
employing the change in Massachusetts corporate law.100
v. To mitigate the endogeneity concerns of the association between staggered
boards and firm value, CLS also examine an important economic channel through
which a staggered board could be associated with an increase in long-term firm
value, i.e., the bonding hypothesis of takeover defenses.101 Under this hypothesis, a
staggered board would provide an efficient commitment device towards the firmspecific investments of a firm’s stakeholders, such as top employees, large
customers, suppliers, and strategic alliance partners. Empirically, we find
confirmation for the bonding hypothesis of staggered boards by documenting that
Id. at 434-36.
Manuel Arellano & Olympia Bover, Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of
Error-Component Models, 68 J. ECONOMETRICS 29 (1995).
94 Richard Blundell & Stephen Bond, Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic
Panel Data Models, 87 J. ECONOMETRICS 115 (1998).
95 M. Babajide Wintoki, James S. Linck & Jeﬀry M. Netter, Endogeneity and the Dynamics of
Internal Corporate Governance, 105 J. FIN. ECON. 581 (2012).
96 Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 436 tbl.8.
97 Id. at 436-37.
98 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, § 8.06(b)–(g) (2018).
99 Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 438 tbl.9.
100 Amihud et al., supra note 6, at 1502-03.
101 Cremers et al., Staggered Boards, supra note 5, at 439-42.
92
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the adoption (removal) of a staggered board has a more positive (negative)
association with firm value among firms with stronger stakeholder relationships,
such as firms with large customers, productive employees, and in strategic
alliances.102 We similarly find that the adoption (removal) of staggered boards has
a more positive (negative) association with firm value among firms whose projects
require longer-term investments and are likely harder to value by outside investors,
such as firms with more investments in innovation and intangibles. 103
CONCLUSION
In this Essay, we examine the criticism offered by a recent paper coauthored by
ASDS of our prior staggered board studies and, in particular, the 2017 CLS study
published in the Journal of Financial Economics. Under this criticism, CLS’s
estimation method (i.e., pooled panel regressions with firm fixed effects) would not
consider the changing nature of firm characteristics over time. Further, we also
examine the main empirical claim of ASDS, namely that when the appropriate
corrections are employed in estimation methods, there is no statistically significant
association between staggered boards and firm value.
We show that ASDS’s criticism of our finding that the adoption of a staggered
board is positively associated with firm value is unwarranted. Correspondingly,
their claim that there is no association between staggered boards and firm value is
likely to be statistically inaccurate, as we also show that the insignificant findings of
ASDS are the result of using a methodology with poor power (i.e., pooled panel Q
regressions with firm fixed effects). In contrast, we show that the result that firm
value tends to increase (decrease) after firms adopt (remove) a staggered board is
strongly statistically significant even over fairly short time periods when a
methodology is used that has relatively strong statistical power (i.e., change in Q
regressions). Lastly, we also show that the estimation methods in CLS have strong
size, meaning that these methods would be unlikely to find a statistically significant
association between staggered boards and firm value if such association was not, in
fact, supported by the data.
We conclude that ASDS does not settle the staggered board debate.
Nonetheless, it does contribute to advance that debate by confirming that the
weight of the available empirical evidence strongly suggests that the earlier valuedecreasing view of staggered boards is unsupported by the data and should thus not
inform policymaking.
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A PPENDIX
FIGURE 2: HISTOGRAMS FOR POWER TESTS OF REGRESSIONS
OF THE LEVEL OF Q
Figure 2, Panel A presents the histogram of the bootstrapped coefficient of Staggered
Board in Table 5, Panel A. Figure 2, Panel B presents the histogram of the bootstrapped tstatistics of coefficient of Staggered Board in Table 5, Panel B. The histograms are based on
the same bootstrap results as reported in Table 5. Each bootstrapped sample is constructed
to be very similar to the actual data, including the cross-sectional and time-series
correlation structure, as described in the text. We construct a total of 10,000 bootstrapped
samples in which there is an association between Q and Staggered Board, where the data is
constructed such that an adoption (dismissal) of a staggered board is association with an
increase in Q of 0.098.

Panel A. Histogram of the bootstrapped coeﬃcient of Staggered Board

2019]

Is the Staggered Board Debate Really Settled?

45

Panel B. Histogram of the bootstrapped t-statistic of the coeﬃcient of

Staggered Board
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